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INTRODUCTION 
Miller v. Alabama1 appeared to strengthen constitutional protec-
tions for juvenile sentencing that the United States Supreme Court rec-
ognized in Roper v. Simmons2 and Graham v. Florida.3 In Roper, the 
Court held that executing a person for a crime committed as a juvenile is 
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.4 In Graham, the Court 
held that sentencing a person to life without parole for a nonhomicide 
offense committed as a juvenile is unconstitutional under the Eighth 
Amendment.5 In Miller, the Court held that a mandatory sentence of life 
without parole for a homicide offense committed by a juvenile is also 
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.6 
When Miller was decided, “nearly 2,500 prisoners [were] presently 
serving life sentences without the possibility of parole for murders they 
committed before the age of 18,”7 with over 2,000 of them sentenced 
under a mandatory sentencing scheme.8 But with no explicit pronounce-
ment regarding retroactivity, states were left to determine whether Miller 
applied to persons whose sentences were already final by the time Miller 
was decided.9 States that considered Miller retroactive then had to deter-
                                                 
 1. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
 2. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 3. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). Sometimes, a fourth case, J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 
131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011), is included in the still-evolving “kids are different” jurisprudence. See 
Shobha L. Mahadev, Youth Matters: Roper, Graham, J.D.B., Miller, and the New Juvenile Jurispru-
dence, CHAMPION, Mar. 2014, at 14, available at 38-MAR CHAMPION 14 (Westlaw). For further 
discussion, see Alex Dutton, The Next Frontier of Juvenile Sentencing Reform: Enforcing Miller’s 
Individualized Sentencing Requirement Beyond the JLWOP Context, 23 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. 
REV. 173, 197 (2013) (“On four occasions—Roper, Graham, J.D.B., and Miller—the Court has 
relied on th[e] doctrine [that juveniles are developmentally different from adults] to require that 
youth be treated differently than adults by the justice system.”). J.D.B. addressed the question of 
“whether the Miranda custody analysis includes consideration of a juvenile suspect’s age.” J.D.B., 
131 S. Ct. at 2401 (citation omitted). J.D.B. involves rights under the Fifth Amendment, whereas 
Roper, Graham, and Miller involve rights under the Eighth Amendment, which is the focus of this 
Article. However, J.D.B. suggests that the developmental difference should have implications far 
beyond the Eighth Amendment. 
 4. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. 
 5. Graham, 560 U.S. at 82. 
 6. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475. 
 7. Id. at 2477 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
 8. Id. 
 9. See infra Part II.A discussing retroactivity. The question of retroactivity may be determined 
by the Supreme Court this fall. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 135 S. Ct. 1546 (2015) (granting 
certiorari). We say “may” for two reasons. The first is that the Court certified a question, in addition 
to the question of retroactivity raised by the petitioner, of whether the U.S. Supreme Court has “ju-
risdiction to decide whether the Supreme Court of Louisiana correctly refused to give retroactive 
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mine how those persons should be resentenced. There was also a pro-
spective problem: aside from knowing that certain mandatory sentencing 
schemes were unconstitutional, states were left to apply the Court’s ob-
servations regarding the differences between youth and adults for pur-
poses of sentencing.  
In the three years since Miller, states have responded with a variety 
of approaches; some state legislatures responded proactively, while oth-
ers let their courts decide.10 Some states have been faithful to the premise 
that juveniles should be sentenced differently from adults, while others 
have resisted it. The result is a patchwork of sentencing regimes that has 
benefited some juveniles, but has left thousands of others languishing in 
prison with no meaningful change to their sentences.11 Commentator 
Mary Berkheiser notes: “The worst of it is that those who were sentenced 
to die in prison when they were as young as fourteen may yet be re-
condemned to live out that sentence.”12 
That thousands remain in prison with no relief for crimes commit-
ted as juveniles—even following Miller—is due in part to the Court’s 
failure to explicitly make a pronouncement regarding retroactivity, as 
well as the lack of clarity regarding what protections are constitutionally 
required when juvenile offenders are sentenced, and when those protec-
tions apply. Without clear guidance, it is unsurprising that the states pri-
                                                                                                             
effect in this case to our decision in Miller v. Alabama.” Id. Further, the Court invited an amicus 
brief to argue against the Court’s jurisdiction. See Docket Entry of Mar. 30, 2015, U.S. SUPREME 
COURT, http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/14-280.htm (last visited 
Aug. 28, 2015). Also, the Court previously accepted certiorari on identical questions in Toca v. 
Louisiana, but that petition was dismissed. See Docket Entry of Feb. 3, 2015, U.S. SUPREME COURT, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/14-6381.htm (last visited Aug. 
28, 2015); see also Helen Freund, Release of Angola inmate leaves cases of 1,500 juvenile offenders 
in limbo, website reports, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Feb. 20, 2015, 11:56 AM), http://www.nola.com/crime/ 
index.ssf/2015/02/release_of_angola_inmate_at_ce.html. 
 10. See infra Part II; see also Cara H. Drinan, Misconstruing Graham & Miller, 91 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 785, 787–92 (2014) (discussing and criticizing various state legislative and judicial respons-
es). 
 11. A number of commentators have been critical of both Miller and the states’ responses to 
Miller. For further discussion on this topic, see, for example, Mary Berkheiser, Developmental De-
tour: How the Minimalism of Miller v. Alabama Led the Court’s “Kids Are Different” Eighth 
Amendment Jurisprudence Down a Blind Alley, 46 AKRON L. REV. 489, 517 (2013) (concluding that 
Miller, by not going far enough, will result in a lack of uniformity and predictability and will result 
in a “process that is fraught with opportunities for prejudice and error”); Drinan, supra note 10, at 
787–92 (discussing and criticizing various state legislative and judicial responses); Marsha L. Levick 
& Robert G. Schwartz, Practical Implications of Miller and Jackson: Obtaining Relief in Court and 
Before the Parole Board, 31 LAW & INEQ. 369, 408–09 (2013) (concluding that many “lifers” will 
face “a sentencing void, with no available constitutional sentence to guide re-sentencing courts” and 
noting the difficulties others will face before hostile parole boards). 
 12. Berkheiser, supra note 11, at 517. 
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marily responsible for sentencing juvenile offenders to life without pa-
role have found ways to circumvent the premise animating Miller: that 
juvenile offenders should receive an individualized assessment of their 
biological traits and environmental influences when being sentenced to 
the law’s harshest penalties. 
Part I sets forth the holding in Miller. Part II describes the incoher-
ent patchwork that has resulted in the three years since Miller as states 
implement and resist Miller’s mandate. Part III describes troubling dis-
parities that exist with regard to youth subjected to the “law’s most se-
vere punishments”13 based on geography and race. The Article concludes 
by observing that sentencing courts have yet to fully appreciate and im-
plement what is constitutionally required to adequately account for the 
differences between youth and adults. 
II. WHAT MILLER SAYS 
In order to understand Miller v. Alabama, it is necessary to appreci-
ate its predecessor cases. The Court’s decisions in Roper and Graham 
paved the way for Miller, and the cumulative impact of the three cases 
establishes that youth are different—not just biologically, but also legal-
ly. 
In Roper, the Court concluded that sentencing youth to capital pun-
ishment constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.14 In reaching this de-
cision, the Court highlighted how “[a] lack of maturity and an underde-
veloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in 
adults and are more understandable among the young. These qualities 
often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.”15 The 
same “signature qualities” that make youth less culpable—
“impetuousness and recklessness”—also render youth more capable of 
reform.16 Accordingly, the Court held that the death penalty was “dispro-
portionate punishment for offenders under 18,” and therefore unconstitu-
tional.17 Roper categorically bars capital punishment for juvenile offend-
ers. 
In Graham, the Court held that sentencing youth to life without pa-
role for nonhomicide offenses constitutes cruel and unusual punish-
ment.18 In doing so, the Court relied once more on the biological differ-
                                                 
 13. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2471(2012). 
 14. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005). 
 15. Id. at 569 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)). 
 16. Id. at 570. 
 17. Id. at 575. 
 18. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010). 
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ences between youth and adults, stating that “developments in psycholo-
gy and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between 
juvenile and adult minds.”19 The Court noted how “parts of the brain in-
volved in behavior control continue to mature through late adoles-
cence.”20 These biological differences in brain development render youth 
more immature, more likely to engage in risky behavior, and more vul-
nerable to external influences like peer pressure.21 The Court reiterated 
that because youth brains are still developing well into late adolescence, 
their personality traits are more transient and more “capable of change 
than are [those of] adults.”22 These youth-inherent traits led the Court to 
categorically bar sentences of life without parole for juvenile 
nonhomicide offenders. 
Miller extended the Court’s reasoning in Roper and Graham to in-
validate state penalty schemes mandating life without parole sentences 
for youth convicted of a homicide offense.23 However, the Court did not 
categorically bar such sentences, as it did in Roper and Graham.24 
Miller involved a direct appeal by Evan Miller, who was 14 years 
old at the time of his crime.25 A companion case decided at the same 
time, Jackson v. Hobbs, involved a collateral challenge by Kuntrell Jack-
son, who was also 14 years old at the time of his crime. Evan Miller was 
charged and convicted of murder in the course of arson; Kuntrell Jackson 
was charged and convicted of capital felony murder and aggravated rob-
bery.26 Both the Alabama27 and Arkansas28 statutes under which Miller 
and Jackson were sentenced carried mandatory sentences of life impris-
onment without the possibility of parole.29 The Court ruled that such 
statutes were unconstitutional. It further made clear that mandatory sen-
                                                 
 19. Id. at 68. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 91–92. 
 22. Id. at 68. 
 23. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012). 
 24. Id. at 2469 (“Because that holding is sufficient to decide these cases, [the Court does] not 
consider Jackson’s and Miller’s alternative argument that the Eighth Amendment requires a categor-
ical bar on life without parole for juveniles, or at least for those 14 and younger.”). The narrowness 
of the holding has been criticized as unprincipled and unsound. See Berkheiser, supra note 11, at 
514. 
 25. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2462. 
 26. Id. at 2461. 
 27. ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-40(9), 13A-6-2(c) (1982). 
 28. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-4-104(b) (1997). 
 29. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461, 2463. The Arkansas statute for capital murder actually permits 
alternative punishments—death or life imprisonment without parole. Life imprisonment without 
parole was mandatory for Kuntrell Jackson, however, because the Supreme Court prohibited capital 
punishment for offenders under the age of 16. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
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tencing schemes that treat children the same as adults fail to account for 
the central considerations underlying Graham and Roper—that children 
have “diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform.”30 Recog-
nizing the “mitigating qualities of youth,” the Court emphasized that sen-
tencing courts must consider a juvenile’s “mental and emotional devel-
opment.”31 
In addition to finding it improper to treat children the same as 
adults, the Court further noted that mandatory sentencing schemes pre-
clude sentencers from considering differences between juvenile offend-
ers. Instead, such schemes treat identically “the 17-year-old and the 14-
year-old, the shooter and the accomplice, the child from a stable house-
hold and the child from a chaotic and abusive one.”32 Mandatory sen-
tencing regimes prevent individualized assessments because “mandatory 
penalties, by their nature, preclude a sentencer from taking account of an 
offender’s age and the wealth of characteristics and circumstances at-
tendant to it.”33 Under mandatory sentencing regimes, the result is that 
“every juvenile will receive the same sentence as every other.”34 
In ordering sentencing courts to consider the “characteristics and 
circumstances attendant to [youth],” the Court stated that “appropriate 
occasions for sentencing juveniles to the harshest possible penalty will be 
uncommon.”35 Before imposing such a serious penalty, a sentencer 
would have to “take into account how children are different, and how 
those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a life-
time in prison.”36 
In sum, the Court’s decisions in Roper, Graham, and Miller “teach 
that in imposing a State’s harshest penalties, a sentencer misses too much 
if he treats every child as an adult.”37 While not exhaustive, the Miller 
Court specifically identified several youth-specific factors for a trial 
court to consider at sentencing, including: 
(1) “the character and record of the individual offender [and] the 
circumstances of the offense;”38 
                                                 
 30. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. 
 31. Id. at 2467. 
 32. Id. at 2467–68. 
 33. Id. at 2467. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 2469. As we discuss infra Part II.B. regarding the Miller sidestep, not all courts agree 
with this characterization of the holding. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 2468. 
38. Id. at 2467. 
2015] Evading Miller 91 
(2) “the background and mental and emotional development of a 
youthful defendant;”39 
(3) a youth’s “chronological age and its hallmark features-among 
them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate the risks 
and consequences;”40 
(4) “the family and home environment that surrounds” the youth, 
“and from which he cannot usually extricate himself—no matter 
how brutal or dysfunctional;”41 
(5) the circumstances surrounding the offense, “including the ex-
tent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer 
pressure may have affected” the youth;42 
(6) whether the youth “might have been charged and convicted of a 
lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with youth,” for 
example, the youth’s relative inability to deal with police and prose-
cutors or to assist his own attorney;43 and 
(7) the youth’s potential for rehabilitation given that most youth are 
prone to change and mature for the better.44 
As explained below, however, too many states are refusing to consider 
these factors when meting out society’s harshest punishments to children. 
III. AN INCOHERENT PATCHWORK OF MILLER IMPLEMENTATION 
Though Miller extended a measure of relief to juvenile homicide 
offenders, it left four questions unanswered. When Miller was decided, 
over 2,000 of the approximately 2,500 juvenile offenders serving life 
without parole had been sentenced under mandatory sentencing 
schemes.45 Most of these sentences were final and could be challenged 
only on collateral review. Would these individuals get relief under the 
rule announced in Miller? For the approximately 380 juvenile offenders 
sentenced to life imprisonment without parole under discretionary sen-
tencing schemes,46 does Miller offer any relief? Does Miller offer any 
                                                 
39. Id. 




 44. Id.  
 45. Id. at 2477 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
 46. See State Distribution of Youth Offenders Serving Juvenile Life Without Parole (JLWOP), 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 2, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/10/02/state-distribution-
juvenile-offenders-serving-juvenile-life-without-parole [hereinafter State Distribution of Youth Of-
fenders Serving JLWOP]. 
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relief to the uncounted number of juvenile offenders serving lengthy term 
of years prison sentences for crimes committed as juveniles? Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, what, if anything, does Miller require when 
courts sentence juvenile offenders? 
A. A Patchwork of Retroactivity 
The Miller Court did not explicitly state that the rule it announced 
was to be retroactively applied.47 However, in the companion case, Jack-
son v. Hobbs, the fact that Kuntrell Jackson was granted a measure of 
relief in his collateral challenge led a number of courts to conclude that 
the Supreme Court impliedly dictated that its rule was to be retroactive in 
application.48 Other courts, though, rejected this notion that the Court’s 
disposition of Jackson’s collateral challenge impliedly established, or 
even supported, retroactive application.49 
In the absence of an explicit pronouncement regarding retroactivity, 
state and federal courts were left to struggle with this question and have 
come to disparate conclusions.50 Though states may have their own rules 
regarding retroactivity,51 retroactivity analysis typically follows the 
framework laid out by the Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane.52 From 
Teague, an “old rule” is one dictated by precedent existing at the time a 
person’s conviction became final and therefore applies retroactively.53 In 
                                                 
 47. Cf. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 135 S. Ct. 1546 (2015) (granting certiorari on whether the 
rule announced in Miller was retroactive).  
 48. See, e.g., Songster v. Beard, 35 F. Supp. 3d 657, 661–62 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (applying its 
holding to Jackson, the Miller Court “made the new rule retroactive”); People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 
709, 722 (Ill. 2014) (though basing retroactivity on its own analysis, finding it “instructive that the 
Miller companion case . . . arose on state collateral review” and “[n]otwithstanding its finality, the 
Court retroactively applied Miller”); Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney, 1 N.E.3d 270, 281–82 (Mass. 
2013). Additional cases can be found in Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, Retroactive Application, in 
Postconviction Proceedings, of Constitutional Rule of Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. 
Ed. 2d 407 (2012), that Mandatory Life Sentence Without Parole for Those Under Age 18 at Time of 
Their Homicide Crimes Violates Eighth Amendment’s Prohibition of Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments, 102 A.L.R.6th 637, at II. § 4 (2015). 
 49. See, e.g., State v. Tate, 130 So. 3d 829, 833 n.1 (La. 2013) (noting that the Miller Court did 
not explicitly address retroactivity, and the “mere fact the Supreme Court remanded Jackson for 
resentencing [does] not constitute a ruling or determination on retroactivity”); People v. Carp, 852 
N.W.2d 801, 830 (Mich. 2014) (rejecting any inference to be drawn from disposition of Jackson’s 
collateral challenge because the state did not assert retroactivity as an affirmative defense to Jack-
son’s challenge); Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81A.3d 1, 4 (Pa. 2013). For additional cases, see 
Kemper, supra note 48, at II. § 5. 
 50. See infra Table 1. 
 51. See Carp, 852 N.W.2d at 832 (discussing retroactivity under Teague and under Michigan’s 
own retroactivity test that may give broader retroactive effect than required by Teague). 
 52. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
53.  Id. at 310. 
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contrast, a “new rule” is one not dictated by precedent at the time a per-
son’s conviction became final, and should be applied retroactively “in a 
collateral proceeding only if (1) the rule is substantive or (2) the rule is a 
‘watershed rul[e] of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fair-
ness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.’”54 
Courts addressing this issue have determined that Miller announced 
a new rule but have come to differing conclusions with regard to whether 
it is substantive or constitutes a watershed rule of criminal procedure. Of 
the twenty-nine jurisdictions (twenty-eight states and the United States) 
with mandatory sentencing schemes resulting in juvenile life without 
parole,55 eleven states have held that Miller is retroactive;56 six states 
have held that it is not retroactive;57 five states and the United States are 
undecided;58 two states may have addressed the issue through legisla-
tion;59 and one state declared that its status as a mandatory jurisdiction 
                                                 
 54. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007) (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 
(1990)). 
 55. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2471 n.9 (2012). 
 56. See, e.g., Hobbs v. Gordon, 434 S.W.3d 364, 369 (Ark. 2014); Falcon v. State, 162 So. 3d 
954, 963 (Fla. 2015); People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709, 722 (Ill. 2014); State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 
107, 155 (Iowa 2013); Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney, 1 N.E.3d 270, 281 (Mass. 2013); Jones v. State, 
122 So. 3d 698, 702–03 (Miss. 2013); State v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716, 731 (Neb. 2014), cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 67 (2014); In re New Hampshire, 103 A.3d 227, 233–34 (N.H. 2014); State v. 
Lovette, 758 S.E.2d 399, 403–404 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014); Ex parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d 66, 75 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2014). 
 57. See Williams v. State, CR-12-1862, 2014 WL 1392828, at *15–16 (Ala. Crim. App. Apr. 4, 
2014) (finding that Miller is a new rule that is neither substantive nor “watershed” and therefore not 
retroactive); State v. Tate, 130 So. 3d 829 (La. 2013); People v. Carp, 852 N.W.2d 801 (Mich. 2014) 
(finding Miller not retroactive under either federal retroactivity analysis or Michigan retroactivity 
analysis); Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 331 (Minn. 2013) (finding that Miller is neither 
substantive nor “watershed”); State v. Shingleton, No. 25679, 2013 WL 5172952, at *1 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Sept. 13, 2013); Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 10–11 (Pa. 2013). 
58. Delaware, Missouri, and South Dakota are explicitly undecided. See Warren v. State, No. 
543, 2012 WL 5873667, at *1 (Del. Nov. 20, 2012) (remand to superior court for consideration of 
Miller retroactivity); State ex rel. Lockhart v. Norman, No. SC93335, State ex rel. Collier v. Russell, 
No. SC92980, State ex rel. Griffin v. Norman, No. SC93324, and State ex rel. McElroy v. Cassady, 
No. SC93465 (four nonconsolidated cases granted review by Missouri Supreme Court); State v. 
Springer, 856 N.W.2d 460, 470 (S.D. 2014) (“[W]e need not decide today whether those three cases 
might apply retroactively.”). New Jersey, with no prisoners serving a mandatory JLWOP sentence, 
has no direct decisional law, though in a case involving a 315-year sentence, a New Jersey Superior 
Court engaged in what might be described as a Miller sidestep by noting that it had discretion in 
sentencing, which made Miller inapposite. See State v. James, 2012 WL 3870349, at *13 (N.J. Su-
per. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 7, 2012), cert. denied, 63 A.3d 229 (N.J. 2013). Connecticut applied Miller 
to a 100-year sentence in a case on direct review, State v. Riley, 110 A.3d 1205 (2015), but has yet 
to explicitly address Miller retroactivity. Federal courts are split with regard to Miller retroactivity. 
Compare Songster v. Beard, 35 F. Supp. 3d 657 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (finding Miller is retroactive), with 
McLean v. Clarke, No. 2:13CV409, 2014 WL 5286515 (E.D. Va. June 12, 2014) (finding Miller is 
not retroactive).  
 59. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-716 (West, Westlaw through the First Regular Session of the 
Fifty-Second Legislature) (providing parole eligibility for juvenile offenders who have served their 
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was incorrect because its judges have discretion with regard to sentenc-
ing.60 We describe this state’s claim of exclusion from the rule as the 
Miller sidestep and discuss it more fully below. 
Expressed differently, based on the uneven distribution of persons 
serving these sentences,61 643 individuals are incarcerated in jurisdic-
tions that have declared Miller to be retroactive and presumably will 
benefit from the new rule when they petition the court; 1,191 are incar-
cerated in jurisdictions that have declared Miller not retroactive, with 
those whose sentences are final receiving no relief; 177 are incarcerated 
in undecided jurisdictions; 60 are incarcerated in jurisdictions that will 
likely receive relief based on legislation; and 48 incarcerated are in a ju-

















                                                                                                             
mandatory minimum sentences); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.035 (2014); State v. Vera, 334 P.3d 
754, 759 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014) (“Because we conclude § 13-716 provides an adequate remedy for 
Vera’s Miller claim, we need not consider whether, before the statute was enacted, Arizona law was 
consistent with the rule announced in Miller, or whether Miller applies retroactively to cases on 
collateral review.”); In re McNeil, 334 P.3d 548, 553 (Wash. 2014) (“The Miller fix explicitly ap-
plies retrospectively to acts that occurred before its enactment.”).  
 60. See Jones v. Commonwealth, 763 S.E.2d 823, 826 n.5 (Va. 2014). We were unable to 
verify the status of three states identified in Miller as having mandatory juvenile life without parole: 
Hawaii, Idaho, and Vermont. 
 61. It is noteworthy that of the over 2,000 individuals serving mandatory life without parole 
sentences, 1,610 are in six states—Florida (266), Illinois (103), Louisiana (335), Michigan (346), 
Missouri (116), and Pennsylvania (444). These numbers, from 2009, approximate those in prison 
when Miller was decided in 2012. See State Distribution of Youth Offenders Serving JLWOP, supra 
note 46. In Part III, infra, this Article examines racial disproportionality in the four states with the 
highest number of persons serving life sentences for crimes they committed as juveniles: Florida, 
Louisiana, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. 
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 Incarceration by Jurisdiction 
(# JLWOP) 
Total # JLWOP 
Miller Retroactive AR (32), FL (266), IL (103), 
IA (44), MA (57), MS (24), 
NE (24), NH (3), NC (44), 




AL (62), LA (335), MI (346), 
MN (2), OH (2), PA (444) 
1191 
Undecided/Split U.S. (36), CT (9), DE (7), 
MO (116), NJ (0), SD (9) 
177 
Legislative Fix AZ (32), WA (28) 60 
Miller Sidestep VA (48) 48 
No Information HI (4), ID (4), VT (0) 8 
 
Table 1. Post-Miller Retroactivity Determinations in Mandatory 
Jurisdictions 
B. Discretionary Life Without Parole 
Although most of the attention in courts and in the scholarly litera-
ture has focused on jurisdictions with mandatory juvenile sentencing re-
gimes, 428 individuals were serving life imprisonment without parole for 
crimes committed as juveniles in sixteen states that had discretionary 
sentencing schemes.62 Despite its language directed toward mandatory 
sentencing schemes, do the considerations underlying Miller nevertheless 
apply to discretionary life without parole sentences? 
Currently, six states have adopted the stance that Miller does not 
apply if courts have any modicum of discretion when sentencing a per-
son for a crime committed as a juvenile.63 In their view, Miller created a 
threshold question—whether a juvenile offender’s sentence was manda-
tory under the state’s sentencing scheme—which, if resolved in the nega-
tive, left these states completely exempt from Miller’s remaining consid-
                                                 
 62. See State Distribution of Youth Offenders Serving JLWOP, supra note 46. 
 63. Murray v. Hobbs, No. 12-880, 2013 WL 593365, at *4 (Ark. Feb. 14, 2013) (foreclosing a 
Miller analysis when sentences are not mandatory); Foster v. State, 754 S.E.2d 33, 37 (Ga. 2014) 
(confining application of Miller’s principles to mandatory sentences); Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 
864, 879 (Ind. 2012) (interpreting Miller to “deal[] solely with the issue of mandatory sentencing 
schemes”); Rohweder v. State, No. 63596, 2014 WL 495465 (Nev. Jan. 15, 2014), cert. denied, 134 
S. Ct. 1896 (2014) (sentencing courts with any discretion cannot run afoul of Miller); Jones, 763 
S.E.2d at 825 (alleging Miller could never apply in Virginia); State v. Redman, No. 13-0225, 2014 
WL 1272553, at *3 (W. Va. Mar. 28, 2014) (finding that “Miller has no applicability” where sen-
tences are not mandatory). 
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erations regarding the differences between youth and adults, and the dif-
ferences between youth.64 
Virginia provides the starkest example of this interpretation. Alt-
hough Miller considered Virginia one of the jurisdictions that had man-
datory life without parole,65 Virginia’s high court eschewed this charac-
terization and found that Miller simply did not apply in the state.66 In 
Virginia, the only punishment available for juveniles convicted of Class 
1 felonies “shall be imprisonment for life.”67 Despite the mandatory ap-
pearance of this sentencing statute, the court in Jones v. 
Commmonwealth disposed of Miller as inapplicable to Virginia’s sen-
tencing scheme.68 In Jones, a juvenile convicted of capital murder, a 
Class 1 felony, appealed his sentence of life without the possibility of 
parole as unconstitutional under Miller.69 Rejecting Miller as inapposite, 
the court explained that Virginia law granted courts the authority to 
“suspend imposition of [a] sentence or suspend the sentence in whole or 
part.”70 Thus, the court reasoned that the sentence was necessarily not 
mandatory because the trial judge had not been entirely “divested . . . of 
all discretion respecting punishment.”71 
Accordingly, after this determination, life without parole sentences 
were not mandatory under Virginia’s capital sentencing scheme, and the 
court discarded any remaining propositions embedded in Miller. Because 
Virginia’s sentencing scheme was not entirely mandatory, neither Mil-
ler’s categorical ban on mandatory life without parole sentences, nor its 
directive to consider a youth’s hallmark features, need be followed. Be-
cause the state technically cannot impose “a mandatory minimum sen-
tence, Miller could never apply in Virginia and, therefore, [the court] 
need not address Jones’ [sic] other arguments.”72 In doing so, Virginia 
                                                 
 64. See infra Table 2. 
 65. See Brief of Respondent, at 17–18, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (No. 10-
9646), 2012 WL 588454, at *21. 
 66. Jones, 763 S.E.2d at 826. 
 67. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-10 (2008). 
 68. Jones, 763 S.E.2d at 826. 
 69. Id. at 823. 
 70. Id. at 824–25 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-303 (2011)). 
 71. Jones, 763 S.E.2d at 825. Although Virginia dismissed Miller because its courts are statuto-
rily empowered to suspend sentences, other states have explicitly rejected the possibility of clemen-
cy as creating a safe harbor from Miller’s mandates. For further discussion, see, for example, Solem 
v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 300–301 (1983) (distinguishing parole, “an integral part of the penological 
system,” from executive commutation, which lacks “reference to any standards.”); State v. Ragland, 
836 N.W.2d 107, 118 (Iowa 2013) (applying Miller to a commuted sentence, because the granting of 
commutation—let alone the possibility of future clemency—“does not foreclose legal challenges”). 
 72. Jones, 763 S.E.2d at 826 n.5. 
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effectively circumvented the Supreme Court’s directive that children 
should be treated differently. 
Other states with “discretionary” life without parole apply Miller 
much like Virginia. In Georgia, courts claim that their state’s sentencing 
scheme cannot violate Miller because judges retain some modicum of 
discretion when sentencing juveniles convicted of the most serious 
crimes. In Foster v. State, the court upheld a juvenile’s life without pa-
role sentence as constitutional, even though the trial court failed to con-
sider any of youth’s mitigating characteristics, as prescribed by Miller.73 
Instead, the court reasoned that Miller applied only to mandatory sen-
tences, which Georgia courts are technically incapable of administer-
ing.74 Because Georgia law requires that a person convicted of murder 
“shall be punished by death, by imprisonment for life without parole, or 
by imprisonment for life,”75 the court concluded that the sentencing 
scheme provided sufficient discretion to satisfy Miller.76 By focusing on 
one dimension of Miller’s holding—that juveniles cannot be sentenced to 
mandatory life without parole—Georgia effectively precludes considera-
tion of the protections announced in Miller. 
Likewise, in Nevada, courts avoid Miller’s holding by relying on a 
binary sentencing scheme. In Rohweder v. State, the court upheld the 
sentencing of a juvenile to life imprisonment without parole because the 
trial court had discretion to constitutionally impose one of three sentenc-
es: (1) death; (2) life without the possibility of parole; or (3) life with the 
possibility of parole after ten years.77 The sentence was not technically 
mandatory, but it still disregarded Miller’s mandate.78 
West Virginia, too, confines the juvenile protections from Miller to 
mandatory sentences. In State v. Redman, the appellant argued he was 
unconstitutionally sentenced to life without parole because the circuit 
court did not hold “a hearing to determine the factors contributing to the 
sentence pursuant to the dictates of Miller.”79 The court rejected this ar-
gument, explaining “Miller has no applicability herein and therefore, this 
assignment of error is without merit.”80 
                                                 
 73. Foster v. State, 754 S.E.2d 33, 35 (Ga. 2014). 
 74. Id. at 37. 
 75. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1 (2014). 
 76. Foster, 754 S.E.2d at 37. 
 77. See Rohweder v. State, No. 63596, 2014 WL 495465, at *1 (Nev. Jan. 15, 2014), cert. 
denied, 134 S. Ct. 1896 (2014). 
 78. Id. 
 79. State v. Riley, No. 13-0225, 2014 WL 1272553, at *3 (W. Va. Mar. 28, 2014). 
 80. Id. 
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In all, at least seven states—Virginia, Georgia, Nevada, New Mexi-
co, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Wisconsin—eviscerate the considera-
tions underlying Miller by limiting its application, in any form, to man-
datory sentences of life without parole. Instead, the courts rely on 
nonmandatory sentencing schemes, which often only provide a choice 
between life without parole and life with parole, and disregard the 
Court’s directive to treat children differently because “Miller could never 
apply.”81 As a result, courts in these jurisdictions do not consider the 
“characteristics and circumstances attendant to [youth]” when sentencing 
juvenile offenders to life without the possibility of parole.82 
 
 Incarceration by Jurisdiction 
(# JLWOP) 
# JLWOP 
Miller Retroactive TN (4)* 275 
Miller Not Retroactive   
Undecided/Split CA (265)*  
Legislative Fix CA (265)* 265 
Miller Sidestep VA (48), GA (8), NV (16), 
NM (0), TN (4),* WV (0), 
WI (16) 
92 
No Information ME (0), MD (13), ND (1), 
OK (48), RI (2), UT (1), 
VT (0) 
17 
* CA and TN appear in two categories.83 
 
Table 2. Post-Miller Retroactivity Determinations in Discretionary  
Jurisdictions 
C. Miller and the “100 Year” Sentence 
The juvenile sentence at issue in Miller was life imprisonment 
without parole.84 Given the posture of the case and the question present-
                                                 
 81. Jones v. Commonwealth, 763 S.E.2d 823, 826 n.5 (Va. 2014). 
 82. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012). 
 83. The issue of Miller retroactivity is before the California Supreme Court. See In re Rainey, 
168 Cal. Rptr.3d 719, 724 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014), review granted and opinion superseded, 326 P.3d 
251 (Cal. 2014). In addition, the legislature has implemented statutes intended to adhere to Miller as 
discussed infra Part III. Tennessee is listed twice because one court ruled that Miller was retroactive 
but another ruled that Miller is not implicated when the sentence had any discretion. Compare 
Darden v. State, No. M2013-01328-CCA-R3-PC, 2014 WL 992097, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 
13, 2014) (finding Miller is retroactive), with Dickerson v. State, No. W2013-01766-CCA-R3-PC, 
2014 WL 3744454, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 28, 2014) (finding Miller not applicable where 
sentencer had discretion). 
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ed by the petitioner, it is understandable that the Court did not address 
sentences for a lengthy term of years that constitutes a de facto life sen-
tence. However, in the same way that it is misleading for a state to reject 
Miller as wholly inapplicable because the sentencing scheme at issue is 
not technically mandatory, it is disingenuous for a state to say that Miller 
(or Graham) does not apply to de facto life sentences.85 
Whether or not a sentencing scheme is mandatory, Miller’s purpose 
is to ensure that all juvenile offenders receive an individualized assess-
ment of their biological traits and environmental influences.86 Likewise, 
a state is misguided to reject Miller as irrelevant solely because a term of 
imprisonment is not labeled “life without the possibility of parole.”87 
Miller’s concern that youth are subjected to disproportionate punishment 
does not diminish for a juvenile who faces a century—or more—of im-
prisonment rather than “life.” 
Miller’s narrowest holding, that the Eighth Amendment shields ju-
veniles from mandatory life without parole sentences, is predicated on 
two well-established constitutional principles. First, the death penalty can 
never be imposed on juveniles.88 Second, a sentence of life without pa-
role, when applied to children, is so similarly punitive to execution that it 
can never be imposed on juveniles for nonhomicide offenses.89 However, 
when states apply Miller differently to century-long sentences than they 
do sentences of life without parole, they overlook the second constitu-
tional underpinning established in Graham. Moreover, because Miller is 
designed to guide sentencers administering the longest terms of impris-
                                                                                                             
84. Though this Article has focused primarily on the implementation of Miller, a number of 
similar issues also remain unresolved with regard to the implementation of Graham, which categori-
cally barred life without parole for juveniles who commit nonhomicide offenses.  
 85. Other commentators have made similar observations and have discussed disparate state 
responses to this issue. See, e.g.,  Theresa Savona, The Growing Pains of Graham v. Florida: Deci-
phering Whether Lengthy Term-of-Years Sentences for Juvenile Defendants Can Equate to the Un-
constitutional Sentence of Life Without the Possibility of Parole, 25 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 182 (2013); 
Kelly Scavone, Note, How Long Is Too Long?: Conflicting State Responses to De Facto Life With-
out Parole Sentences After Graham v. Florida and Miller v. Alabama, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3439 
(2014); Krisztina Schlessel, Note, Graham’s Applicability to Term-of-Years Sentences and Mandate 
to Provide a “Meaningful Opportunity” for Release, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1027 (2013). 
 86. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467–68 (listing factors associated with youth underlying the 
Court’s determination that mandatory sentencing schemes that result in life without parole necessari-
ly preclude consideration of these relevant factors). 
 87. Cf. Scavone, supra note 85, at 3444 (stating that while not categorically barred, “lengthy 
sentences without parole eligibility create the exact result that the Court was trying to avoid in Miller 
and Graham”); Schlessel, supra note 85, at 1053 (“Courts ought not to violate a constitutional rule 
by engaging in a simple play on words.”). 
 88. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005). 
 89. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
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onment, when states misapply its holding, they effectively contravene the 
Eighth Amendment. 
New Jersey is an example of a state that improperly applies Miller. 
In State v. James, a juvenile offender was sentenced to serve a minimum 
of 267 years and nine months of a 315-year sentence before becoming 
eligible for parole.90 On appeal, the court acknowledged that Miller re-
lied on a strand of precedent that banned sentencing practices “based on 
the mismatches between the culpability of a class of offenders and the 
severity of the penalty.”91 While the court acknowledged that sufficiently 
severe penalties implicate Miller, it squarely rejected Miller as inappo-
site, asserting that a nonmandatory, nonlife without parole sentence “runs 
afoul of neither precept upon which the Court based Miller.”92 
Similarly, intermediate courts in Florida have ruled that Miller does 
not control unless the sentence at issue is for life without parole. In Walle 
v. State, a thirteen-year-old offender was sentenced to sixty-five years 
imprisonment to run consecutively with a twenty-seven year sentence 
previously imposed in a different county. In effect, the child was not eli-
gible for parole until he was ninety-one years old.93 The court assumed, 
for argument’s sake, that the sentence equated to life without parole. 
However, it still rejected Miller’s call for an individualized consideration 
of the offender’s youth, holding that the sentence was not life without 
parole, but merely “an extraordinary length.”94 
In contrast, other courts have recognized a sentence as legally 
equivalent to life without parole when the parole eligibility date falls out-
side the juvenile offender’s natural life expectancy.95 When a juvenile 
faces the functional equivalent of life without parole, “he is entitled to 
the benefit of what Miller termed Graham’s ‘categorical ban’ on sen-
tences of life in prison” without meaningful opportunity for release.96 By 
confronting the substantive elements of Graham and Miller, these courts 
remain faithful to the overarching principle that children are different. 
                                                 
 90. State v. James, No. A-4153-08T2, 2012 WL 3870349, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
Sept. 7, 2012). 
 91. Id. at *13 (emphasis added) (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463–64 (2012)). 
 92. Id. 
 93. See Walle v. State, 99 So. 3d 967 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 94. Id. at 972–73. 
 95. People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291, 295 (Cal. 2012). Courts have used the Center for Dis-
ease Control’s life expectancy tables to determine whether a sentence qualifies as the functional 
equivalent of life without parole. See, e.g., Thomas v. Pennsylvania, No. 10-4537, 2012 WL 
6678871, at *11 (E.D. Pa. June 5, 2012); People v. Mendez, 188 Cal. App. 4th 47, 63 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2010); Adams v. State, No. 1D11-3225, 2012 WL 3193932, at *2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2012).  
 96. Caballero, 282 P.3d at 297 (Werdegar, J., concurring) (quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465). 
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Life without parole and death sentences are unique from all other 
punishment in that they “alter[] the offender’s life by a forfeiture that is 
irrevocable,” and “deprive[] the convict of the most basic liberties with-
out giving hope of restoration.”97 A sentencing body therefore overlooks 
one of Miller’s most fundamental constitutional underpinnings when it 
tells a child, “I just have to make sure that you don’t get out of the peni-
tentiary. I’ve got to do everything I can to keep you there, because it 
would be a mistake to have you back in society.”98 Roper, Graham, and 
Miller have rejected this explanation as constitutionally repugnant be-
cause the Eighth Amendment “forbid[s] States from making the judg-
ment at the outset that those offenders never will be fit to reenter socie-
ty.”99 It is a fallacy, then, to describe Miller (or Graham) as inapposite 
when a child has been deprived of any “meaningful opportunity to obtain 
release” simply because of semantics.100 
D. Sentencing Juvenile Offenders Under Miller 
Putting questions of retroactivity, mandatory versus discretionary 
life without parole, and lengthy term of years sentences aside, what does 
Miller require when juveniles are sentenced? On one end of the spec-
trum, some states have concluded that Miller must mean more than mere-
ly requiring sentencing courts to mechanically impose one set of sen-
tences for everyone under the age of 18. These courts have concluded 
that sentencers must consider certain characteristics about youth—other 
than age alone—before imposing significant sentences. For instance, 
though Pennsylvania courts have rejected applying Miller retroactive-
ly,101 in prospective applications, Pennsylvania courts must consider, at a 
minimum,  
a juvenile’s age at the time of the offense, his diminished culpa-
bility and capacity for change, the circumstances of the crime, 
the extent of his participation in the crime, his family, home and 
neighborhood environment, his emotional maturity and devel-
opment, the extent that familial and/or peer pressure may have 
affected him, his past exposure to violence, his drug and alcohol 
history, his ability to deal with the police, his capacity to assist 
                                                 
 97. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 70 (2010). 
 98. Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 548 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 99. Graham, 560 U.S. at 75. 
 100. Id. at 79. 
 101. Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 10–11 (Pa. 2013) (rejecting Miller retroactivi-
ty). 
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his attorney, his mental health history, and his potential for re-
habilitation.102 
Alabama has adopted a similar approach to Pennsylvania. Alabama re-
jects retroactive application of Miller,103 but has chosen, with regard to 
prospective application, to adopt the same factors Pennsylvania identi-
fied in Knox when deciding between life imprisonment with or without 
parole.104 
California has a discretionary sentencing scheme under which juve-
niles convicted of special circumstances murder received a sentence of 
“confinement in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole, 
or at the discretion of the court, 25 years to life.”105 Prior to Miller, Cali-
fornia courts had consistently construed this statute as creating a pre-
sumption of life without parole.106 After Miller, the California Supreme 
Court could have found Miller inapplicable to its discretionary sentenc-
ing scheme (Miller sidestep); instead, it found that Miller required disap-
proval of this presumption in favor of life without parole.107 It also ruled 
that courts must consider “any age-related matter suggested by the evi-
dence or by common experience or morality that might reasonably in-
form the choice of penalty,”108 and pointed out that Miller calls for courts 
to consider “a range of factors” attendant to youth—not just age.109 Ac-
cordingly, the California Supreme Court held that after Miller “a court 
must consider a juvenile offender’s ‘chronological age and its hallmark 
features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreci-
ate risks and consequences.’”110 The court also observed that many other 
states were requiring sentencers to consider factors other than age.111 
                                                 
 102. Commonwealth v. Knox, 50 A.3d 732, 745 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012). 
 103. See Williams v. State, CR-12-1862, 2014 WL 1392828 (Ala. Crim. App. 2014). 
 104. Ex parte Henderson, 144 So. 3d 1262, 1283–84 (Ala. 2013) (citing Knox as generally 
helpful). 
 105. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.5 (b) (West, Westlaw with urgency legislation through Ch. 224 
of 2015 Reg. Sess.). 
 106. See generally People v. Gutierrez, 324 P.3d 245 (Cal. 2014) (discussing consistent ap-
proach by California courts in the two decades before Miller). 
 107. Id. at 267. 
 108. Id. at 268. (discussing CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(i) (1978)) (citation and internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 (2012)). 
 111. Id. at 269 (citing cases from other jurisdictions to indicate that “the emerging body of 
post-Miller case law has uniformly held that a sentencing court must consider [these factors] before 
imposing life without parole on a juvenile homicide offender”). Other states such as Iowa and Wyo-
ming have decided that Miller applies both retroactively and prospectively and require consideration 
of factors beyond mere chronological age. See, e.g., State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 74 (Iowa 2013) 
(“We think the direction from the Supreme Court that trial courts consider everything said about 
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Likewise, Washington law requires “sentencing bodies [to] engage 
in individualized consideration of juvenile offenders facing life in prison 
without the possibility of parole.”112 Also in line with California, the 
Washington State Legislature passed what has come to be known as the 
Miller fix, which states: 
In setting a minimum term, the court must take into account 
mitigating factors that account for the diminished culpability of 
youth as provided in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) 
including, but not limited to, the age of the individual, the 
youth’s childhood and life experience, the degree of responsi-
bility the youth was capable of exercising, and the youth’s 
chances of becoming rehabilitated.113 
In contrast, Texas construes Miller extraordinarily narrowly and 
takes a dramatically different approach from that employed by Califor-
nia, Washington, and several other states. Although the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals held that Miller is retroactive, the Texas Legislature 
effectively nullified this ruling when it revised its youth sentencing re-
gime and prevented its courts from individually considering a youth of-
fender’s characteristics.114 Currently, Texas imposes a mandatory sen-
tence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole for youth con-
victed of capital offenses.115 As a result, Texas courts reject defendants’ 
requests for individualized sentencing hearings under Miller. Instead, a 
defendant is “only entitled to have his sentence reformed from life with-
out parole to life with the possibility of parole.”116 
These differing approaches highlight the ways in which states are 
both construing and misconstruing Miller. 
                                                                                                             
youth in Roper, Graham, and Miller means more than a generalized notion of taking age into con-
sideration as a factor in sentencing.”); Bear Cloud v. State, 294 P.3d 36, 47 (Wyo. 2013) (listing 
factors to consider at an individualized sentencing hearing to include a youth’s “mental and emo-
tional development,” “family and home environment,” and “the way familial and peer pressure may 
have affected” the crime). 
 112. In re McNeil, 334 P.3d 548, 552 (Wash. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 113. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030(3)(b) (2015).  For a more extensive discussion on Wash-
ington’s legislative approach, see, for example, Nick Straley, Miller’s Promise: Re-evaluating Ex-
treme Criminal Sentences for Children, 89 WASH. L. REV. 963, 995–96 (2014). 
 114. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.31(a)(1) (2013). 
 115. Turner v. State, 443 S.W.3d 128, 129 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). 
 116. Id. at 129. See also Lewis v. State, 428 S.W.3d 860, 863–64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) 
(“Miller does not entitle all juvenile offenders to individualized sentencing. It requires an individual-
ized hearing only when a juvenile can be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. . . . 
[U]nder Section 12.31 of the [Texas] Penal Code, juvenile offenders in Texas do not now face life 
without parole at all.”). 
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IV. GEOGRAPHIC ANOMALIES AND RACIAL INEQUALITIES EXPOSED BY 
EXAMINING STATES’ POST-MILLER JURISPRUDENCE 
Examining the various approaches to applying Miller does more 
than just illuminate whether states are interpreting the Court’s holding 
faithfully. For instance, a state’s method of implementing Miller—
coupled with data about the juveniles sentenced to life without parole 
under that sentencing scheme—can provide a lens through which the 
racial disparities in the greater criminal justice system are even more 
pronounced. 
In March 2012, The Sentencing Project published a comprehensive 
report about key characteristics of juveniles sentenced to life without 
parole.117 In the first-ever national survey of its kind, the Project collect-
ed data on many factors including socioeconomic backgrounds, educa-
tion levels, racial compositions of victims and offenders, and types of 
physical and emotional trauma experienced by offenders-to-be. Two sta-
tistical disparities stood out. One was the high concentration of juvenile 
lifers being sentenced in only four states. The second was the high rate of 
black youth sentenced to life without parole. 
First, when Miller was decided, approximately 2,500 people were 
serving life sentences for crimes they committed as children. More than 
half of those sentences occurred in just four states: Pennsylvania (472), 
Michigan (356), Florida (335), and Louisiana (228).118 These unusually 
high concentrations of convictions are possibly explained by mandatory 
sentencing schemes, which, prior to Miller, each of these states had in 
place. Even in Miller’s wake, these states remain committed to keeping 
juvenile offenders incarcerated. Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Louisiana 
still refuse to give Miller retroactive effect.119 The criminal justice sys-
tems in these states continue to affect youth at a rate that dwarfs the rest 
of the country. 
While thirteen states have banned juvenile life without parole and 
sixteen others deemed Miller retroactive (with fifteen more still consider-
                                                 
 117. ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE LIVES OF JUVENILE LIFERS: FINDINGS 
FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY (2012), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/jj_The 
_Lives_of_Juvenile_Lifers.pdf. 
 118. See JOSHUA ROVNER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AN 
OVERVIEW (2015), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/jj_Juvenile_Life_ 
Without_Parole.pdf. These numbers are slightly different from the 2009 numbers from State Distri-
bution of Youth Offenders Serving JLWOP, supra note 46. 
 119. See, e.g., State v. Tate, 130 So. 3d 829 (La. 2013) (finding Miller is not retroactive), cert. 
denied, 134 S. Ct. 2663 (2013); People v. Carp, 852 N.W.2d 801 (Mich. 2014); Cunningham, 81 
A.3d 1 (Pa. 2013). But see Falcon v. Florida, 162 So. 3d 954 (Fla. 2015) (finding Miller is retroac-
tive). 
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ing the issue), more than half of the child offenders Miller sought to 
reach remain imprisoned by these four states. For this reason, legal de-
velopments in even one of these four states would impact large numbers 
of juvenile lifers. It is therefore important for the Supreme Court to rule 
that Miller be given retroactive effect. Not only would the Court unify a 
nationally fractured body of law, it could bring Miller’s premise—that 
children are different—to thousands of people that, as children, were sen-
tenced to die in prison. 
Second, juvenile life without parole sentences also predominantly 
affect one race. Though black youth make up approximately 15% of the 
U.S. population,120 56.1% of those sentenced as juvenile offenders to life 
without parole are black.121 The rate at which white juvenile offenders 
are sentenced to life without parole for killing a black person (3.6%), is 
roughly half the rate at which white juveniles are arrested for killing a 
black person (6.4%).122 In contrast, the rate at which black juvenile of-
fenders are sentenced to life without parole for killing a white person 
(43.4%) is almost double the rate at which black persons are arrested for 
killing a white person (23.2%).123 It is hard to imagine what legitimate 
factors could explain such a statistically vast discrepancy. Although the 
causes of this trend are unclear, it is disturbing that the already dispro-
portionate rate of incarcerated black people also includes children. 
CONCLUSION 
In Montgomery v. Louisiana, set for the October 2015 term, the Su-
preme Court may resolve the retroactivity question and settle once and 
for all Miller’s application to the 1,191 juvenile lifers in states rejecting 
Miller retroactivity, and to the 177 juvenile lifers in the undecided juris-
dictions. However, the full extent of Miller’s reach will likely remain 
unresolved and will be highly contested for years to come. 
What is clear is that many jurisdictions are actively resisting Mil-
ler’s mandate to consider youth-specific factors at juvenile sentencing 
for the law’s harshest penalties. The problem with the sentencing 
                                                 
 120.  OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
JUVENILE POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS (2014), available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ 
population/qa01104.asp?qaDate=2013. 
 121. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, RACIAL DISPARITIES IN SENTENCING 2 (2014), 
available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/141027_iachr_racial_disparities_aclu_ 
submission_0.pdf. 
 122. JOSHUA ROVNER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AN 
OVERVIEW 3–4 (2015), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/jj_Juvenile_Life_ 
Without_Parole.pdf. 
 123. Id. at 3. 
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schemes directly struck down in Miller is not simply that they were man-
datory, but that the mandatory nature of those sentencing schemes neces-
sarily precluded sentencers from considering the key aspects of youth 
that make juvenile offenders different from adult offenders. The remedy 
then is that a sentencer must “follow a certain process—considering an 
offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing a par-
ticular penalty.”124 While the particular penalty at issue in Miller was life 
without parole, the Court also clearly pronounced that “youth matters for 
purposes of meting out the law’s most serious punishments.”125 
In the years to come, the Court will likely be asked what counts as 
the “law’s most serious punishments,” and also whether youth matters 
only for the law’s most serious punishments or if youth becomes a factor 
whenever a juvenile offender is subjected to adult sentencing guidelines. 
In the meantime, thousands remain in prison, waiting for what was prom-
ised in Miller. 
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